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Few Chaucerians today would doubt that Chaucer's little critical "essay" at the close 
of the General Prologue of the Canterbury Tales has a significance well beyond the brief 
annotation of Robinson's second edition, and the annotation of the Riverside edition: 
Crist spak hymself fui brode in hooly writ, 
And wel ye woot no vileynye is it. 
Eek Plato seith, whoso lean hym rede, 
The wordes moote be cosyn to the dede (1:739-42).1 
The key words of the passage are probably "cosyn to the dede," which have a peculiar 
fascination for Chaucer, as they do for Jean de Meun. In Chaucer, the phrase returns 
on two—and perhaps more—occasions: in Fragment VIII, the host Harry Bailly asks 
why the canon is so shabbily accoutred: 
Why is thy lord so sluttish, I the preye, 
And is of power bettre cloth to beye, 
If that his dede accorde with thy speche? (VIII: 636-8). 
And, in Fragment IX, in the course of the Manciple's discussion of the wife's apparent 
infidelity, he notes: 
The wise Plato seith, as ye may rede, 
The word moot nede accorde with the dede. 
If men shal telle proprely a thyng, 
The word moot cosyn be to the werkyng (IX: 207-10). 
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Scholars sometimes include in this tally a stanza from "Lak of Stedfastnesse" which 
may also have reference to the Platonic dictum: 
Sometyme the world was so stedfast and stable 
That mannes word was obligacioun, 
And now it is so false and deceivable 
That word and deed, as in conclusioun, 
Ben nothing lyk, for turned up-so-doun 
Is all this world for mede and wilfulnesse, 
That al is lost for lak of stedfastnesse (1-7). 
Also relevant here might be the closing passage of the Miller's "Prologue," although 
the relationship to Plato's dictum is veiled, if it exists at all: 
What sholde I moore seyn, but this Millere 
He nolde his wordes for no man forbere, 
But told his chéries tale in his manere, 
M'athynketh that I shall reherce it heere. 
And therefore every gentil wight I preye, 
For Goddes love, demeth nat that I seye 
Of yvel entente, but for I moot reherce 
His tales alle, be they bettre or werse, 
Or elles falsen som of my mateere (1:3167-75). 
The fuller meaning of Chaucer's Platonic preoccupation has recendy occasioned 
serious study, the most elaborate approach being the dissertation of Jeffrey Alan 
Hirshberg. Hirshberg concerns himself only with language and rhetoric at the expense 
of more fundamental consideration of the ontology of the Platonic myth which is 
central, as will be argued here, to Plato's own meaning. More recently, Rodney 
Delasanta has commented on the "epistemology of truth-telling in fiction: The wordes 
moote by cosyn to the dede'" (151), and Ralph W.V. Elliot in a chapter entided T h e 
Wordes Moote by Cosyn to the Dede" does not consider the classical background to 
Chaucer's allusion. Paul B. Taylor, in the best study to date of the aphorism, examines 
precedents in an array of classical texts in the Platonic tradition to determine Chaucer's 
attitude towards language—although Taylor, like Hirshberg, does not consider the 
mythical traditions concealed in the allusion. Finally, Robert Myles investigates 
concepts of philosophical realism and nominalism contemporary to Chaucer's cultural 
context, in connection with theories of a speaker's intentionality in language: the 
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"wordes" may also be willed not to be "cosyn" to the "dede," for, as he suggests, "the 
real intention is in the mind of the sign-maker" (29). 
These critical approaches have substantial depth and perceptiveness, but there are 
further considerations involved in the Platonic dictum with which they have not come 
to grips. In order for us to address these considerations, let us begin by citing the 
relevant full passage from Plato's Timaeus in BuiVs edition: 
Accordingly, in dealing with a copy and its model, we must affirm that the 
accounts given will themselves be akin [syjyjmeis] to the diverse objects 
which they serve to explain... rather we should be content if we can furnish 
accounts that are inferior to none in likelihood, remembering that both I 
who speak and you who judge are but human creatures, so that it becomes 
us to accept the likely account of these matters and forbear to search 
beyond it (29B-D). 
Slightly above this passage, Plato also remarks: 
Now the whole heaven, or Cosmos...we must first investigate concerning it 
that primary question which has to be investigated at the outset in every 
case—namely, whether it has existed always, having beginning of genera-
tion, or whether it has come into existence, having begun from some begin-
ning. It has come into existence \ßegonen\ (28B). 
On the first cited passage, Janet E. Smith writes: 
Eikotes hgoi (likely stories) or mythoi^ then, are like the demiurge's universe: 
they are good copy of what is real. That is, just as the demiurge makes a 
good universe insofar as he imitates the Forms, or what is real, so too, the 
philosopher writes a likely account insofar as he bases his account on what 
he knows. The accounts, then, are provisional or approximate in the sense 
that, if one's knowledge of the divine or of sense particulars were to 
advance, one would readjust one's likely account in accord with that knowl-
edge (36).2 
Smith demonstrates that the Platonic syflgeneis or word "akin" to deed addresses the 
issue of the power of language to describe a reality beyond its own capacity for 
empirical reference: that is to say, language in Plato may well refer to empirical, 
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physical objects, or experiential concepts, but it must also refer to the Ideal or Good, 
concepts which are eternal.3 In this way, the function of Platonic myth expressed in 
words cousin to the deed is to orient the use of language toward an ideal Form that 
is not generated, but eternal. Smith writes: 
Most, if not all, the myths in Plato are very much a mixture of discussion of 
the phenomenal world and an attempt to direct attention to the "worlds 
beyond"; there is a reciprocal effort to use sense particulars (and images) to 
clarify the nature of a Form or Forms, combined with the effort to perfect 
one's account of the "world below" by reference to one's knowledge of the 
Forms (34). 
The likelihood of the myth is, then, measured in its appeal to the Ideal, which is 
ungenerated and eternal, and this is a major theme of Plato's theory of myth. 
The widespread influence of Calcidius' Latin rendering of the Timaeus is well-
known. Plato's syggeneis here appears as: 
Causae quae, cur unaquaeque res sit, ostendunt, earundem rerum consan-
guineae sunt (22). 
[The causes (myths) that show why each thing has its being are akin to the 
things themselves]. 
Thus, Calcidius' consanguineae renders Plato's syggeneis, and will return in Boethius' 
cognatos, Jean de Meun's "cousin" and Chaucer's "cosyn" (Taylor 323). 
Plato's theory of language is compatible with Augustine's classic formulation of 
the nature of sign and meaning: signs ultimately reveal an ideal meaning, oriented 
toward the eternity of God. Among many passages in De doctrina Christiana is the 
following: 
Thus every sign is also a thing, for that which is not a thing is nothing at 
all; but not every thing is also a sign. And thus in this distinction between 
things and signs, when we speak of things, we shall so speak that, although 
some of them may be used to signify something else, this fact shall not dis-
turb the arrangement we have made to speak of things as such first and of 
signs later (1.2, p. 9 of D.W Robertson translation). 
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Boethius' own Augustdnian positions on the function of language and concept have 
been well presented (Starnes). Thus, when Boethius invokes Plato's topic in Book III, 
prose 12 of the Consolation of Philosophy, the context is Lady Philosophy's discussion 
of Plato's ideal Good: 
But if we have dealt in arguments not sought outside but set within the area 
we were working in, there is no reason for you to wonder, since you have 
learned under Plato's authority that words should be akin [cqjjnatos] to the 
things spoken about (305-7). 
Here Boethius takes a position as an Augustinian interpreter of Plato's likely stories, 
addressed to the Good, stories that are couched in figurative language. Moreover, as 
we saw in the Timaeus, the world came into being {gegarten 28B) and therefore will 
probably end—being ontologically quite unlike eternity. Thus, Boethius is able to 
make the crucial distinction between God's eternity in an uncreated order of 
understanding, and the world's perpetuity (that is, its existence only in a human order 
of time and understanding), an existence that does not control its own power of 
reference, but is answerable to a superior order of knowing. In this way, Boethius 
writes at a central moment of the Consolation (V.6): 
And therefore those are not right who, when they hear that Plato thought 
this world neither had a beginning in time nor would have an end, think 
that in this way the created world is made co-eternal with God...And so if 
we wish to give things names befitting them, then following Plato we 
should say that God indeed is eternal, but that the world is perpetual (425-
7)-4 
Ultimately, the Platonic topic of cousins to the deed leads us to consider the power of 
language as a technology of the rational intellect to address ideal uncreated orders of 
being and understanding in the eternity of God. Plato's use of myth supports, then, 
this use of language. This is, as will emerge, Jean de Meun's reaction to the relationship 
of words and things as well. 
I Jean de Meun and the Timaeus 
Jean de Meun sees in the Timaeus a type of Genesis (Hadot 113), and his poem is 
concerned with many things; however, one of his major themes is the perpetuation of 
the physical world, by contrast to the eternity of God—in Boethian and Platonic terms. 
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It is in this context that the poem includes frequent discussions of castration.5 Raison 
speaks: 
Joutice, qui jadis regnot, 
au tens que Saturnus regne ot, 
cui Jupiter coupa les coilles, 
ses filz, con se fussent andoilles 
(moût ot ci dur filz et amer) 
puis les gita dedanz le mer, 
donc Venus la déesse issi (5505-11). 
[Justice, who reigned in former times, when Saturn held sway, whose testi-
cles Jupiter his son cut off as if they had been sausages, and then threw 
them into the sea (Saturn had many hard and bitter sons), from which the 
goddess Venus arose.] 
In fact, Jean's Boethian lady is concerned with the loss of the Golden Age, but we 
know that Amant objects to her use of a discourteous term: 
Se ne vos tiegn pas a cortaise 
quant ci m'avez coilles nomees (6898-9). 
[Indeed I do not consider you to be courteous, when a moment ago you 
named the testicles to me.] 
To justify her use of language, Raison invokes the Timaeus: 
Et ce que ci t'ai recité 
peuz trover en auctorité, 
car Platon lisoit en s'escole 
que donee nous fu parole 
por fere noz volairs entendre, 
por enseigner et por aprendre. 
Ceste sentence ci rimee 
troveras escrité en Thimee 
de Platon, qui ne fu pas nices (7067-75). 
[And what I have here recited to you, you may find in authoritative texts, 
for Plato could be read in school that we may learn that words were given 
to use to make our will be known, to teach and to learn. This theme here 
expressed in rhyme you will find set down in the Timaeus of Plato, who was 
no fool.] 
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She also has an earlier unmistakable appeal to Plato's cousin to the deed: ou par mes 
fez ou par mes diz (6982). But to Amantes objection to the use of the word "testicles" 
she responds that God at the Creation (7059-60) left language and linguistic evolution 
to her: 
mes il vost que nons leur trovasse 
a mon plesir et les nomasse 
proprement et conmunement 
por craistre nostre entendement (7061-4). 
[But He (God) wanted me to find names for them, at my discretion, so 
that I should name them appropriately and in common parlance, in order 
to increase our understanding.] 
.6 She adds that it scarcely matters what terminology we use: 
se je, quant mis les nons au choses 
que si reprendre et blasmer oses, 
coules reliques apelasse 
et reliques coules clamasse, 
tu, qui si m'en morz et dépiques, 
me redeïsses de reliques 
que ce fust lez moz et vilains (7079-85). 
[If, when I put names to things which you dare thus to object to and to 
blame, I had named "testicles" as "relics" and had called "relics" "testicles," 
you who thus criticise and reproach me for this would retort that "relics" 
were an ugly word, and base.] 
She concludes her argument with a plea for figurative reading in a symbolic 
interpretation of coules:7 
En ma parole autre sen ot, 
au mains quant des coulons parloie (7128-9). 
[In my words there is another meaning, at least when I was speaking of tes-
ticles.] 
This other meaning is the truth beneath the fictive veils of the poets: 
La vérité dedenz reposte 
seroit clere, s'el iert esposte; 
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bien l'entendras, se bien répètes 
les integumanz aus poètes. 
La verras une grant partie 
des secrez de philosophie (7135-40)8 
[The truth therein hidden would be clear, if it were expounded; and you 
will learn it well, if you study well the fictive veils of the poets. There you 
will see a large part of the secrets of philosophy] 
In the end, at work in Jean's poem are two contrasting conceptions of love: Amant's 
physical interests in winning the Rose and deflowering her (21574-6), and Raison's 
interest in the eternal presence of God, perceptible in figurative ways through 
metaphors and fables. Amant, of course, explicidy denies these: 
Mes des poètes les sentances, 
les fables et les methaphores 
ne bé ja pas a gloser ores (7160-2). 
[But as far as the thought, fables, and metaphors of the poets are con-
cerned, I do not now aspire to gloss them.] 
Moreover, Jean has other explorations of Plato's aphorism, in connection with the 
Timaeus. Amant, for example, invokes Sallusfs De coniumtione catalinae 3 in his 
discussion of the pursuit of love, and of the ways of women. He suggests that words 
should resemble the deeds they describe: 
...li diz doit le fet resambler; 
car les voiz aus choses voisines 
doivent estre a leur fez cousines (15160-2). 
[...for what one says must resemble the deed. Words that are neighbours to 
things must be cousins to their deeds.] 
However, this topic addresses human history and deeds, and is therefore probably not 
Platonic, or only so by irony (Taylor 321). On the other hand, Genius, Nature's other 
self, promises an entry into a physical paradise of natural reproduction if words are 
cousins to the deed. 
Et si vos ainsinc preeschiez, 
ja ne seroit anpeeschiez, 
selonc mon dit et mon acort, 
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mes que li fez au dit s'acort, 
d'entrer ou parc du champ joli (19903-5). 
[And if you preach thus, you will not be hindered, according to my words 
and with my agreement, and that the deeds accord with the words, from 
entering into the park of the beautiful field.] 
Obviously, Genius, like Nature, is interested in applying Plato's figurative aphorism 
to the physical perpetuation of the world, in Jean's biting ridicule and irony—and in 
his criticism of Genius' utter degradation of the true Platonic and Boethian power of 
language to address the eternal Good. Meanwhile, Nature, herself frightened by death 
(15935-6), seeks to perpetuate the physical world, although she does acknowledge the 
supreme mystery of the Incarnation, which alone delivers us from death. 
Ainz fui trop formant esbahie 
quant il de la Vierge Marie 
fu por le chetif en char nez, 
et puis panduz touz acharnez; 
car par moi ne peut ce pas estre 
que riens puisse de vierge nestre (19127-32). 
[Indeed, I was absolutely amazed when He became incarnate in the Virgin 
Mary for the sake of poor mankind, and was then hanged in the flesh; for 
by my office it cannot happen that anything can be born of a virgin.] 
She remarks that Plato could not understand the Incarnation: 
Si n'an pot il assez dire, 
car il ne peiist pas soffire 
a bien parfetemant antandre 
ce c'onques riens ne pot comprandre, 
for li ventres d'une pucele. 
Mes, san faille, il est voirs que celé 
A cui le ventres an tandi 
plus que Platon an antandi... (19089-96). 
[Thus he (Plato) could not say enough, for he could not do enough to 
understand perfectly what never anything can comprehend, except for a vir-
gin womb. But, without doubt, it is true that the virgin whose womb was 
filled knew more (about human salvation) than Plato.] 
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While she is correct in saying that Plato never heard of Christ, Jean is obviously 
mocking her inability to understand that in the Timaeus Plato's cousin to the deed and 
his theory of likely stories that are myths refer to the Ideal Good, compatible, though 
not identical, with the Christian God. In the end, the climax of Nature's and Genius' 
materialistic and naturalistic denial of God's saving eternity in favour of the 
perpetuation of the physical world occurs when Genius triumphandy announces that 
his Pare of sexual reproduction is eternal: 
il n'a futur ne preterit, 
car se bien la vérité sant, 
tuit li trois tens i sunt presant, 
li quex presans le jour compassé... 
car li soleuz resplandissanz, 
qui tourjorz leur est parissanz, 
fet le jour en un point estable, 
tel c'onc au printans pardurable (19986-9, 19997-20000). 
[The Parc has neither future nor past, for if I guess the truth correcdy, all 
three tenses are present here, and the present encompasses the day...for the 
resplendent sun, which is always evident to the world, creates the day in a 
fixed point, such as in a perpetual spring.] 
Thus, Jean has brilliandy inverted the capital Boethian and Platonic distinction 
between created (human and empirical) time (perpetuity) and God's eternity beyond 
time, which allows Jean in turn to write ironically about his true interest in invoking 
Plato's cousin to the deed. His true interest is the Christian God's eternity, as Plato's 
interest was in the Good, as in the passage from the Timaeus. For Jean, Plato's aphorism 
is therefore an invitation to speculate on the Christian God's saving eternity, which 
can only be grasped through the figurative use of language and myth. 
II Chaucer's Speakers: Figurative Meanings in the Canterbury Tales 
Chaucer, or his narrator, opens his views in the General Prologue by denying any villainy 
("n'arette it nat my vileynye" 726) in his plain speaking, some of which is obscene. 
This declaration seems to be in accord with Raison's plain speaking about testicles in 
the Roman. Chaucer further points out that he is using sources (*Svhoso shal telle a 
tale after a man" 731), and that he has to rehearse these words even if they are 
"rudeliche" (734). Otherwise, he would distort the truth of his tale ("Or ellis he moot 
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telle his tale untrewe" 735) for "Crist59 spoke figuratively or "brode" in "hooly writ" 
(739), and thre was no "vileynye" in it (740). Plato, for those who can read him, says 
that words should be "cosyn to the dede" (742) in such a way that there is a direct 
analogy between Plato's use of language and Christ's—who was able to speak the ideal 
truth because He spoke in parables (myths) of figurative meaning. 
Chaucer therefore understood full well the figurative power of Plato's myths to 
speak about an eternal ideal beyond the empirical referentiality of language, and also 
understood full well Jean de Meun's major poetic strategy in the Roman, which consists 
in ridiculing his speakers' attempts to reduce the Platonic eternity and the Christian 
saving eternity (as expressed in figurative language) to a simple preoccupation with 
the materialist concerns of a putatively eternal physical world.9 How Chaucer's irony 
is directed against his speakers' linguistic and naturalistic materialism is food for much 
thought.10 Watts and Utz remark correcdy that "there is no consensus about how 
Chaucer's poetry should be understood in relationship to fourteenth-century 
nominalism." Nonetheless, the Platonic topic in Chaucer must refer to his desire that 
words should be related to Plato's universal ideals—a realist position—while they 
"cozen" the natural things to which they refer. Taylor suggests that "Chaucer's view 
of language is that of a Christian Platonist, in that he aspires toward a linguistic realism 
in which intent informs deeds through the ministry of words" (325). Myles also 
discusses the Platonic topic as reflected in Boethius' use of it: 
Boethius' understanding of the function of human will in directing the 
proper 'cosyning'/cousining or the improper 'cosyning'/duping of the rela-
tionship between word and the thing is also Chaucer's understanding. 
Implicit here, for Chaucer, is a linguistic intentionalist realism (24). 
Chaucer probably has an ironic attitude toward his speakers' concerns with the natural 
world and with the content of their stories—although it might be rash to assume for 
this reason that Chaucer's realism or pursuit of the universal Ideal involves a systematic 
rejection of his speakers' putative nominalism. It seems enough to argue here that 
Chaucer's use of "cosyn" aligns him with a Platonic conception of language. 
For example, the topical Boethian providence or "Goddes pryvetee" 1.3558, 
develops in the Miller's Tale in a way that is oddly associated, or contrasted, with 
human secrecy and privacy expressed repeatedly in the words "privée" (3295) and 
"deerne" or secret (3200), as the obscene narrative advances. In fact, the secret doings 
in the dark in the tale as a whole operate under the eye of providence, which cannot 
102 Chaucer's "Cosyn to the Dede" 
be deceived, and from which nothing can be concealed. Thus, the Miller's fascination 
with dark secrecies places itself in the perspective of a higher order of providence that 
he seems to deny in his preference for material acts utterly devoid of any spirituality. 
The Platonic contrast between human perception and God's ideal order of knowing 
could not be clearer, as it is also clear that the Miller wishes to degrade providence to 
the level of being a simple human, and obscene, secret. Similarly, compare the Man 
of Law's fear (11.90-03) of being likened to the foolish Piérides of Ovid's Metamorphoses 
V, who sang in a materialist poetics of the giants' attempted overthrow of the gods, 
only to be defeated by Calliope, first of the Muses, who sings of the providential order 
of Proserpina's and Pluto's marriage decreed by the fates. 
Central to this kind of consideration is the linguistic self-contradiction and 
confusion at the close of the Wife of Bath's Tale^ when the hag offers the young knight 
a choice, to have her foul and old but faithful or young and fair but adventurous. She 
then contradicts herself by promising to be both, that is fair or young and also good 
or old (III.1241). Obviously, the tale as a whole is about marriage, a sacrament of an 
ideal religious dimension, degraded by the Wife into a frantic carnival of death and 
remarriage at the close of the tale. There remain many other examples of Chaucer's 
search for a figurative meaning beyond the literal-mindedness of his characters, 
including the possibility that the famous April opening of the General Prologue can be 
linked to the creation of the world (Myles 56-7). However, in the Nun's Priest's Tale^ 
which has explicit Genesis material, the world began in March (VII.3187-8), and the 
tale handles the fall of man ("And made Adam fro Paradys to go" 3258) both comically 
and ironically in Chaucer's expert irony. Chauntecleer escapes from the fox's jaws and 
appears to return physically to paradise. However, we have no hope of returning to a 
physical paradise; rather, we are delivered from death by the Redemption, which is a 
figurative concept (Rom 6:5). 
Chaucer also remodels themes and images from the portrait of Faux-Semblant in 
the Roman de la Rose in his depiction of the wretched Pardoner, who insistendy refers 
to the possibility of Redemption (VL532, 658, 766, 902) from a fallen world, but 
with obvious material interests in the gold the rioters sought under the tree. Thus, the 
Pardoner has downgraded the ineffable mystery of the Redemption into a search for 
gold that he pretends to condemn, but with which he secretly sympathises given his 
attempts at hawking his relics at the close. The fullest citation of the Platonic aphorism 
and the one which most clearly exemplifies Chaucer's Platonic and Boethian irony 
occurs, however, in the Manciple's Tale: 
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The wise Plato seith, as ye may rede, 
The word moot nede accorde with the dede. 
If men shal telle proprely a thyng; 
The word moot be cosyn to the werkyng (IX:207-10). 
The Manciple's apparent strategy here follows the model of Ovid's Metamorphoses 
H.596-632 and attempts to represent Phoebus as a human lover—in other words to 
reduce the god to a human and empirical status in a materialist order of poetic 
representation. However, Apollo was unable to have a physical relationship with 
Daphne in Metamorphoses 1.452-567, and in Metamorphoses XI. 165-71, he is the 
triumphant victor over the materialist poetics of Pan. Moreover, Arachne, in Book VI, 
attempts to represent the gods in bestial forms, for which Athena defeats her and 
transforms her into a spider. Also, in Book V, as previously discussed, the Piérides 
seek to represent Phoebus as a crow (329), for which their punishment results in their 
being transformed into chattering magpies. Thus, Chaucer's tale involves a silent 
condemnation of the crow's materialist poetics, in his reporting of the wife's adultery 
(whether literally true or false at the empirical level), for indeed the crow should be 
singing about fate and not material events. Like Arachne the spider, the crow is no 
doubt a former human reduced to the status of an animal—no augural bird—on 
account of the human's materialist poetics. The figurai truth about Phoebus is that he 
is the god of poetry, president of the Muses, and not concerned in any way with 
empirical events. 
Chaucer's cousin to the deed is therefore a highly-charged comment, comparable 
perhaps with Chaucer's oft-expressed interest in Macrobian dreams. The "cosyn" 
comments on the ultimate function of poetry, which is to speak of the eternity (cousin) 
beyond literal language (deed) that Plato's myths address, and adapts that concept to 
the Christian doctrines of God's eternity beyond time, an eternity from which 
humanity is delivered by the Incarnation (celebrated indirecdy in the Pardoner's Tale). 
In the end, Chaucer silendy rejects the naturalism and empiricism of his speakers, for 
they often seek, as do the French Amant, Nature and Genius, for the indefinite 
perpetuation of the physical world in a human order of knowing. This would deny 
Christ's supreme saving eternity, the focus of the Parson's argument. It follows from 
this mode of analysis that Chaucer's irony nevertheless forces his speaker to reflect on 
spiritual meanings, much as Jean forced the French Nature to refer to the Incarnation 
by which we are delivered both from the empirical and physical world and also from 
our created order of understanding. This, then, is the central meaning of Plato's 
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brilliant cousin to the deed, and this is Chaucer's intent in his systematic pursuit of an 
eternal salvation among the linguistic and iconographie confusions of his speakers in 
the Canterbury Tales. 
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Notes 
1 Citations of Chaucer are from the Riverside edition, ed. Benson. Translations 
from Latin and French texts are my own unless otherwise indicated. 
2 See also Callahan on the controverted function of Platonic myth, and more 
recendy Stewart. 
3 The meaning of Plato's Cratylus, his comic but serious dialogue on the origins 
and function of language, is often debated, but see Guthrie on the final position of the 
Cratylus that "names do give information by distinguishing between classes of 
experience of things ('It wasn't a burglar, only a cat'), but only if the essences are known 
beforehand" (438AB, p. 28). Similarly, "[s]o we reach the seriously meant conclusion 
of the dialogue, that names offer no help in discovering the essential nature of things, 
though they serve to communicate these natures when known. With cats and burglars 
this is easy, but not with the supremely important Fprms of Good, Beautiful and Just, 
and others which are the Platonic philosopher's primary concern." See also the section 
entided 'The Dream of an Ideal Language: the Politicus, Phaedrus and the Cratylus" 
in Baxter, pp. 80-5. 
4 The controversy in late antiquity over the question of whether the world could 
be co-eternal or not with God is carefully discussed by Courcelle, 221-31. Medieval 
thinkers close to Jean de Meun and Chaucer were likewise preoccupied with this 
problem; see Dales "Discussions of the Eternity of the World" zndMedieval Discussions 
of the Eternity. Abelard was also fascinated by this Platonic topic; see Moonan. 
5 Aside from Raison's intervention on this theme, see Jaloux' discussion of 
Abelard's castration (8766-8), Nature's reference to Origen's self-castration (17022-
3), and Genius' threat of castration for those who do not reproduce (19633-42). 
Citations of the Roman are from Lecoy. 
6 This passage is controversial. Fleming argues (correcdy, I believe) that Rai-
son's inspiration is Augustinian, in that words should be directed toward teaching us 
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the figurative apprehension of God (97-135), appealing in particular to Augustine's 
rhetorical formulations on the significance of words and signs in theDeMajjistro. 
Other writers, however, see in Jean's attitude toward signs an interest in empirical 
experience (Poirion 178-9), or "in language's independent expressivity outside the 
bounds of specific authority or intentionality" (Huit 123). Poirion, and perhaps 
Huit, seem to be formalists in that they believe that language has the power to con-
trol its own meaning, a position specifically contradicted in Guthrie's final assess-
ment of the Cratylus. 
7 The "coilles/reliques" catachresis probably has to do with Raison's desire to 
convert an empirical object (a testicle) into a sacramental one (a relic). Amant, of 
course, objects to the sacramental function of language. 
8 "Integument" is related to the term involucrum, a medieval equivalent of 
Plato's myths. See the classic discussion with reference to the Timaeus in Chenu, with 
additional comment by Stock and Dronke. 
9 It may well be that Raison, Boethian daughter of God, escapes Jean's biting 
ridicule, but this point remains for me unresolved (see also Kelly). 
10 Luria seems justified, in his review of the older work of Fansler on Chaucer 
and xheRofnan, when he remarks (273n) that there is "no modern study devoted to 
this important literary connection," that is, the nature of the Roman's impact on the 
larger structures and organisation of the Canterbury Tales (but see Diekstra). Aside 
from the recent discussion of Chaucerian realism by Myles, the article of Watts and 
Utz is helpful (cited here from p. 161). 
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